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MANAGEMENT AND THE MINUTE MAN 
Carl A. Jansen 
1/Lt USAF 
Patrick AFB, Florida
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the "Space Age", the United States has achieved many 
significant firsts in the field of technology. This is particularly evident in 
the development of today1 s advanced weapon systems. The term, weapon 
system, is defined as an instrument of combat integrated with all it f s associ­ 
ate equipment, support facilities and services. This includes assembly of 
material, personnel, installations, plans, directives and procedures required 
to enable the instrument of combat to accomplish it's tactical mission. General 
Schriever, Commander of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) stated at 
the National Advanced Technology Management Conference held in Seattle, 
Washington, "sound management is clearly the pacing factor in technological 
progress. It is essential to the timely acquisition of the new Air Force 
Systems ... in all this effort there is no substitute for technological compe­ 
tence and sound management practices. "1 Application of modern management 
practices to the Minuternan /veapon System Development Program will clearly 
indicate how sound today's progressive management can be.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the key policies and procedures 
enacted at the various managerial levels during the Minuteman Program's 
implementation. The specific managerial levels which will be examined 
are: system program management, corporate management, and field level 
management. The selection of these areas is justified on the basis of the 
present organizational structure which denotes these levels to be the key 
areas of the program.
II. SYSTEM PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
The concept of the "second generation* 1 Inter-Continental Ballistic 
Missile (ICBM) was developed by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) as a means 
of advancing the "state of the art" in nuclear weapon delivery capability. The 
Qualitative Operational Requirements specified by SAC determined the basic 
operational capabilities of the proposed weapon system. Technical feasibility 
studies were then conducted in the early months of 1955 by a team, of special­ 
ists from the Ballistic Systems Division (BSD), formerly the Ballistic Missile 
Division, (AFSC), and the Ramo /Vooldridge Corporation. The conclusions 
of this group, in 1958, indicated that such a system was technically feasible. 
This result allowed the Department of Defense to approve the concept and 
initiate the Research and Development (E&D) Minuteman Program.
NOTE: The views presented in this paper are that of the author and are not 
considered to be that of the U. S. Air Force.
188
Under the direction of General Schriever, then Commander of the vVestern 
Development Division, AFSC, the policy of management control by the military 
program office was emphasized for this Program. The organizational concepts 
developed during the Atlas and Titan programs were the forerunners to the Minute- 
man organizational structure. Under the Minuteman organizational plan, the Air 
Force was to provide program management through a BSD System Program Direc­ 
tor. Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., (STL) was to provide systems en­ 
gineering and technical direction. The integrated efforts of these two organizations 
(managerial and technical) proved to be the basis on which all primary decisions 
were to be made. * TSome of the most severe problems in the aerospace industry 
today are not technical but management. In the world of the technological explo­ 
sion, our greatest challenge is to develop our management techniques to keep pace 
with and control the rapid advance of technical know-how. "^ The success of the 
Minuteman Program was the direct result of key decisions developed by the 
BSD/STL team at the outset of the program. Some of the key program policies 
and procedures which were established included:
(1) Concurrency:
The weapons system was developed and acquired under the concurrency con­ 
cept. "One aspect of the concurrency concept which is quite evident in the Minute- 
man Program is that portions of the design, production, and operational activation 
phases actually overlap. tT ^ The Minuteman Development Program was scheduled 
to extend over three key-testing phases:
(a) Research and Development Tests (R&D). In this phase, BSD supervised 
the development of the integrated system composed of component subsystems* The 
tests were predominately contractor efforts, with increasing military participation 
leading to the demonstration that design goals had been met under non-operational 
conditions. This was planned at two distinct test sites, Category I testing at the 
Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR), and Category II testing at the Air Force 
Western Test Range (AFWTR).
(b) Demonstration and Shakedown Tests (PASO). These tests were conducted 
by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) assisted by BSD in an operational environ­ 
ment using operational procedures. During these tests, operational and logistical 
procedures were refined. In addition, basic system capabilities and limitations 
were demonstrated. Only then was the determination made that the Minuteman 
Weapon System configuration had been sufficiently stabilized to perform its in­ 
tended mission.
(c) Operational Tests (OT). This test program was designed to exercise the 
operational system in as near an operational environment as possible. The 
operational tests determined the weapon system reliability and accuracy planning 
factors, at specified confidence levels and intervals. This data was essential to 
SAC in determining the operational employment of the missiles against prime 
target areas. As SAC assumed additional operating command control of the 
Minuteman Weapon System, added tests were conducted to insure that the
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established reliability and accuracy factors were preserved during the life of 
the weapon system. This would be on a continuing basis.
(2) Reliability:
"Reliability was firmly established as one of the prime development require­ 
ments and was considered in virtually every management and technical decision. 
Reliability-was not considered as an afterthought as was the case in many other 
systems. f? To enforce this concBpt, a distinctive Reliability Program Plan was 
designed to become part of the contractors work statement. fThese program 
plans, written by the contractor and subject to the approval of BSD/STL, contained 
distinct reliability tasks, specific procedures, responsibilities, schedules and 
criteria for completion. Numerical reliability requirements were made part of 
every contract. ff ^
(3) Cost-effectiveness:
In order to minimize the cost for a given task, cost-effectiveness was deter­ 
mined to be one of the fundamental factors used in the evaluation of all contractor 
programs. This approach was also applied to decisions regarding proposed design 
changes for increasing the system1 s reliability. "Cost-effectiveness was made the 
yardstick by which the various reliability efforts would be judged. fl ' This cost 
standard proved successful in all phases of the program.
(4) Contractors:
A major company was scheduled to handle the integration and test of the weapon 
system. Other associate contractors were responsible for the Guidance and Control 
sub-system (G&C), the Re-entry Vehicle sub-system (RV), and the three motor 
sub-systems (stages 1 to 3). A total of six major contracts were scheduled for 
bidding. This contracting method allowed for a wider field of bidding which ulti­ 
mately lowered the overall cost of the system.
(5) Information Control:
Sound managerial control was maintained over the entire weapon system pro­ 
gram through the application of the latest informational control techniques. Com­ 
puters and nationwide communication networks were utilized to maintain effective 
interface control between the associate contractors. In addition, the contractors 
were constantly required to maintain a current status of all functions in the program. 
Mr. T. A. Wilson, Minuteman Manager for the Boeing Company, recently comment­ 
ed, ffit is this common communication link of the functional analysis program which 
enables us to describe every element of the weapon system, lay it out on the table, 
agree on a concept or configuration and prevent deviations by either military or 
contractor participants. ff^ This type of configuration control was emphasized with 
every contractor associated with the Minuteman Program* It proved to be a 
significant asset to all levels of management.
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The selection of the specific associate contractors was also based on im­ 
portant engineering design criteria which was correlated to the managerial pro­ 
cedures explained above. The basis for these specifications were formulated 
before the program's activation. The basic design criteria established for the 
contractor bidding phase included:
1. Design range - 6,300 miles.
2. Propulsion system - three stage, solid propellant motors. (This design 
was selected on the principle of greater simplicity and reliability as compared to 
liquid propellant systems. In addition, its' instant readiness reduced the pre­ 
paration time for an operational launch).
3. Guidance and Control (G&C) subsystem - all inertial unit with no external 
commands needed except the launch command once the target was set into the air­ 
borne computer.
4. Re-entry Vehicle (RV) - designed for a ballistic re-entry. In addition, it 
contained a thermonuclear warhead.
5. Airframe - consisted of the following units: three motor casings; G&C 
section; RV; two interstages; and the first stage skirt.
6. Missile assembly - assembled at a centrally located production depot 
under conditions where the environment was conducive to precision assembly and 
check-out.
7. Operational deployment - deployed in hardened and dispersed silos and also 
railroad launchers. (The railroad launcher concept later proved to be unsound on 
the'basis of cost and reliability. It was, therefore, discarded as a secondary 
launch mode.)
8. Operational personnel - a two man crew with a multi-launch capability 
from a central control center.
The aforementioned criteria was based on maximizing both cost-effectiveness 
and reliability. All the aspects of the proposed weapon system including the 
operation and maintenance requirements in the field were considered. As a 
result, "the Minuteman ICBM is designed to have the best cost-effectiveness of 
any current weapon system. "^ Figure 1 denotes the basic design configuration 
of the airborne hardware.
Based on the preceding concepts regarding management and engineering design, 
The Boeing Company was selected as the successful bidder to integrate and test 
the Minuteman Weapon System. The remaining major associate contractor 
responsibilities were assigned to the following companies:
Guidance and Control (G&C) subsystem: North American Aviation Corp.,
Autonetics Div.
Re-entry Vehicle (RV) subsystem: AVCO Corp. 
First Stage engine: Thiokol Corp. 
Second Stage engine: Aerojet General Corp. 
Third Stage engine: Hercules Powder Co.
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In addition to the development of the weapon system, plans were initiated 
to construct the first operational SAC Wing at Malmstrom AFB, Montana* The 
two major air commands involved in the Project (AFSC and SAC) were primarily 
responsible for selecting and activating this site. The U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers was assigned the primary task to oversee the basic "brick and mortar11 
construction phase of the silos and launch control centers. Employing the integra­ 
tion efforts of Boeing, BSD was designated to certify the acceptability of the weapon 
system installation. Figure 2 indicates the organizational structure for all phases 
of the program.
The application of the concurrency concept to the overall Minuteman Program 
Schedule indicates that the planners were very optimistic as to the program1 s out­ 
come. Drafted in early 1958, the R&D schedule called for the first flight test by 
the end of December 1960. In addition, the first Minuteman Wing was to become 
operational by mid-1963. This schedule established a precedent in the total de­ 
ployment time for an operational ICBM weapon system.
III. CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
Examination of the management philosophy of The Boeing Company provides 
a common understanding as to how the remaining associate contractors operated 
during the program. The interfaces between each associate required close overall 
liaison. This was particularly true for Boeing which was the integrator for the 
weapon system.
The assignment of the Minuteman contract was the first time Boeing had been 
associated with the development of an ICBM. Boeing, therefore, was faced with 
an entirely new set of complex development problems concerning high reliability 
and cost-effectiveness design criteria. The concept of concurrency on the scale 
of the Minuteman contract was relatively new to the top management of the company. 
It was essential for the company to develop unique integration functions which 
would meet the performance and schedule requirements. Four primary factors 
were set up to meet this challenge; functional analysis, interface control, the 
Minuteman Production Board, and master schedule and allocations. (1) Functional 
Analysis was used to define and control acquisition of all elements of the weapon 
system - equipment, facilities, data, and personnel. This process established all 
functional requirements to fulfill the Air Force Weapon System Specification for 
the Minuteman. (2) Interface Control was the detailed mating specification between 
hardware supplied by various contractors. This function has had its counterpart 
in every major weapon system. (3) The Minuteman Production Board concerned 
itself with the delivery of the operational bases on schedule. The ability to meet 
this requirement was dependent upon the timely delivery of government-furnished 
equipment to the sites from all contractors, including Boeing. (4) Master Schedule 
and Allocations provided for the orderly, in-sequence planning of equipment 
allocations. It provided a consolidated listing of all equipment required at each 
base, the dates needed, and supplier's capability to produce. -XJiis information was 
assembled, published and controlled by Boeing for the USAF.
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In addition to the above important initial steps in the program, Boeing 
also realized the need for an efficient managerial information system which would 
present critical information required for the key decision makers in the program* 
BSD had recognized the need for this significant effort with time-phased goals to 
develop management tools that could keep up with the dynamic pace of the technical 
work involved. Therefore, in order to direct their efforts in a manner compatible 
with Air Force requirements, Boeing created a series of management event-logic 
networks. This presentation technique was an extrapolation of the Program 
Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) which was developed by the Navy for the 
Polaris Program. The event-logic network functions are noted in Figure 3.
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FIGURE 3
The Boeing Company's Event-Logic Network
"These networks depicted all acquisition events within Boeing and the interchanges 
between Boeing and all other government and contractor organizations. It is a 
functional analysis of the management job necessary to acquire a particular weapon 
system. ff ^ The event-logic network was essential for all complex functions. 
This fact is evident by the number of management interfaces between Boeing and 
BSD. Exclusive of normal financial and schedule status reporting, there are 
actually over 600 categories of management interfaces between these two organiza­ 
tions. "Since each category may involve hundreds of repetitive occurrences of 
such things as criteria submittals, -specification approvals, etc,, the total picture 
involves approximately 100 ? 000 actions. 12
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Mr. T. A. vVilson recently stated, "management's function is to control by 
providing direction and support. This means sound and timely planning . . . 
7/e must not forget that management tools are like many other potent tools - 
they work both ways." 13 In order to better evaluate the applications of such 
tools as the event-logic network and other integration techniques, it would be 
advantageous to enumerate Boeing's primary responsibilities in the Minuteman 
Program. These functional areas included:
1. Supplying substantial portions of the operational ground and maintenance 
support equipment, missile transportation and handling systems,, missile inter­ 
stage structure, and the airborne and ground instrumentation for both AFETR 
and AFWTR test programs.
2. Primary responsibility to assemble and assist in testing the weapon system 
under the direction of BSD and STL. This involved the missile assembly, inte­ 
gration, and functional testing of the weapon system at AFETR and AFWTR as 
well as the assembly and initial checkout of the weapon system at operational SAC 
bases. Boeing's extensive Seattle Test Facility was also used to test the com­ 
patibility of the operational ground support equipment in a controlled environment.
The need for functional control in all these related areas clearly indicated 
why it was essential for Boeing to initiate the unique functional integration pro­ 
cedures. The employment of these tools has worked effectively, and has contri­ 
buted significantly to Boeing's success in assisting the development of the final 
product, a fully operational Minuteman vVeapon System.
IV. FIELD LEVEL MANAGEMENT
Examination of the Minuteman Program at a field level reveals how success­ 
ful the overall program management concepts were applied at the local level. The 
organizational structure and control of the R&D flight testing at AFETR was typical 
of a field level organization in the Minuteman Program. The flight testing program 
was set up through the cooperation of the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) 
formerly the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR),, under the sole direction of BSD.
The primary mission of the Minuteman Program at AFETR was, ftto demon­ 
strate that a functional ballistic missile has been developed, to obtain data for 
design improvements and to demonstrate that performance capabilities of the missile 
meet the operational requirements. tfl4 These mission functions have been broken 
down into seven key operational areas for each missile test.
1. Receiving inspection and functional test of the inidividual missile sub­ 
systems and systems.
2* Prelaunch assembly and checkout of the missile.
3. Acceptance by the Air Force of each delivered missile.
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4. Acquisition and handling of preflight test data.
5. Launch of the missile.
6. ffQuick-look" analysis of the flight test data*
7. Preparation of field and flight test reports on each missile.
Other operations at AFETR include, tests and reports covering facility checkout 
and mechanical and electronic checkout of associated ground support equipment.
The organizational structure of the Minuteman Test Facility at AFETR has 
proven to be the key to effectively flight testing the Minuteman under the basic 
concepts of high reliability and low cost-effectiveness. Figure 4 denotes the prime 
related functional areas among the various military and civilian organizations. The 
Minuteman Weapon Division, 6555th Aerospace Test Wing (ATW), is responsible 
for the management of the AFETR Minuteman Flight Test Program and the opera­ 
tion of the Minuteman Launch Area, including the missile launches. In addition, 
the utilization of "Blue Suit" launch crews has been a significant asset to the pro­ 
gram in terms of cost reduction and management control.
Under the concurrency program, the initial planning effort included the design 
of a Missile Assembly Area and a Missile Launch Area (Complex 31). The support 
facilities at Complex 31 included ability to launch from three different modes; rail­ 
road transporter, launch pads, and silos. This was a true indication of the effort 
in which the concurrency concept was envisioned for a field test site. In addition, 
the establishment of dual facilities for each mode of launch, with the exception of 
the single railroad system, created the ability for a faster launch rate. Figure 5 
indicates the launch area configuration after all the dual facilities were completed.
The initial test objective at AFETR was to flight test the entire airborne systems 
during the first launch. This was proven to be a complete success when the first 
Minuteman, Flight Test Missile 401, was launched from Pad 31 at 11:00 AM EST 
on Wednesday, February 1, 1961. Approximately twenty-five minutes later, the 
RV impacted on target into the Atlantic Ocean, 4600 miles down range from the 
test site. This flight alone proved to be a milestone in missile technology. The 
complete airborne system was functionally tested during its initial flight. This 
concept of multiple functional tests of combined subsystems, as indicated by the 
first launch, was one of the key concepts which was stressed throughout the 
Minuteman Program. It proved to be a significant asset in developing a complex 
operational weapon system a year ahead of schedule.
The close cooperation between all organizations, both military and civilian, 
has to a high degree been responsible for the early detection of crucial design 
improvement areas which could prove costly under a concurrency program. The 
System Integration and Test Plan, under which the major responsible organizations 
at AFETR are governed, explains the primary related interfaces between each 
contractor. Major work items performed by Boeing and the other Associate Con­ 
tractors at AFETR are defined by engineering drawings and procedures.. Air Force
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acceptance of the work is based upon review of the results from the tests pre­ 
scribed by engineering procedures, upon STL recommendations concerning 
technical adequacy, and upon Quality Control verification that the work was per­ 
formed in accordance with approved engineering instructions. 15 This concept has 
proven to be very effective in maintaining configuration control of all phases of 
assembly, test and launch of the Minuteman. The end result has been the immediate 
availability of critical information to both management and engineering in the event 
modifications are needed to correct major malfunctions in the weapon system, both 
R&D and Operational. Again, this success has been attributed to the broad manage­ 
ment policies developed at the outset of the Minuteman Program.
In addition to the primary test objective, SAC later established a secondary 
objective for early participation of the operating command in the development tests 
and evaluation of the Minuteman at AFETR. "This was necessary in order to pro­ 
vide familiarization, training, and experience required to achieve the earliest 
operational and logistic support capability. ff The Launch Operations Area has 
been the primary focal point where the majority of the SAC personnel have been 
utilized. This has proved to be a significant asset to BSD also, since the required 
compliment of Test v^ing personnel has been reduced without degrading the launch 
capability.
The mission success at AFETR clearly indicates how the key program policies 
and procedures were applied to a regional organization. Efficient overall manager­ 
ial control was an absolute necessity when launch operation requirements were to 
be satisfied.
V. OVERALL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
The Minuteman was the first solid-propellant ICBM and represented a signi­ 
ficant economic advance in the development of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Program. 
It is a weapon system predicated on high reliability, maximum simplicity, de­ 
creased reaction time, and a greatly improved cost-effectiveness concept. "The- 
countdown and flight reliability of the system is currently exceeding its operational 
requirements and appears to have stabilized at this high value ... In no case is 
there a major subsystem which has failed to measure up to its operational require­ 
ment. This means that the G&C, propulsion, air frame, RV, and inline operating 
ground equipment (OGE) subsystems are all meeting or exceeding their operational 
r equir ement s. f f ^ "
In addition to the high performance rating of the final product, the time factor 
is also noteworthy. The first wing of the Minuteman (Malstrom AFB, Montana)
was brought to an operational status one year ahead of the original schedule. 
Four other major wings are or will be operational within a year. These wings are 
located at Ellsworth AFB., South Dakota; Minot AFB, North Dakota; Miiteman AFB, 
Missouri; and Barren AFB, Wyoming. These scheduled accomplishments establish­ 
ed a in the acquisition of a major ICBM weapon system. Figure 6 
summarizes the primary functions involved in the acquisition of the weapon system 
at the respective operational SAC wings. Under the program's concurrency con­ 
cept all are continuous. The primary operations at present, however,
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center about the modification network loop. All major modifications are based 
on updated reports from all related activity areas. This error detection process 
will continue to be utilized until the weapon system is declared obsolete.
The completion of the five operational wings will not end the Minuteman 
Development Program. A new advanced Minuteman II has already been flight 
tested at AFETR on 24 September 1964. It represents an increase in both range 
and deployment capabilities compared to the operational Minuteman I. Minuteman 
II is scheduled to be operationally deployed at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The significance of these accomplishments both in performance and schedule 
requirements must be attributed primarily to the sound management disciplines 
which were developed at the outset of the Minuteman Program. The basis for 
every key decision in the program can be traced to certain specific managerial 
principles. The key policy was the utilization of BSD as the primary management 
organization. This created greater control over all the contractor functions. In 
addition, the concurrency, cost-effectiveness, configuration control and reliability 
standardization techniques contributed significantly to the program7 s success. 
General Schriever has stated that one of the "most serious problems in space and 
missile development concerns the development of managements methods."1 ** 
The success of the Minuteman was due to the introduction of new managerial tools. 
The Minuteman is not considered the ultimate in weapon system management 
complexity and effectiveness. Future advanced development programs will require 
added support through the application of new managerial methods. The tools and 
concepts implemented in the Minuteman Program are the forerunners of new 
approaches towards greater managerial efficiency.
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Bernard A. Schriever, 'The Air Force Systems Command Programs11 , 
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